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insurable interest in the subject property should be required
only at the time of loss. It is further suggested that whether
Article 2278(3) of the Civil Code merely limits the method of
proving a promise to pay the debt of another or renders the
promise void, it should not be applied to the promise made to
induce the promisee to extend credit to another, Louisiana juris-
prudence to the contrary notwithstanding.
Sydney B. Nelson
MINERAL LEASES - EXECUTION BY LANDOWNER WHO IS
ALSO AGENT FOR SERVITUDE OWNER
Plaintiff conveyed title to 160 acres of land by act of par-
tition to his brother, the defendant,' reserving one-half the
minerals. The act contained an agreement whereby defendant
was granted full power of attorney to make and execute oil and
gas leases affecting all of the mineral interest in the land. It was
provided that any bonus, rental money, and future royalties
would be equally divided between the brothers. Eight months
before accrual of liberative prescription against plaintiff's
mineral servitude, defendant executed a mineral lease with a
primary term of five years, to commence four days after pre-
scription would have accrued on the plaintiff's servitude. Con-
temporaneously with the execution of the lease, defendant and his
lessee agreed that the bonus would be put in escrow pending title
examination.2 One month before expiration of the prescriptive
period, plaintiff made written demand on the defendant, the
lessee, and the escrow agent, for payment of one-half the bonus,
and one-half of all future rentals and royalties which might be-
come due. Upon being refused, the plaintiff instituted an action
for a declaratory judgment recognizing his rights. The trial court
rendered judgment in his favor. On appeal, the court of appeal
held, affirmed. The lease of the entire mineral interest was
valid and binding as of its date of signing by defendant and
lessee. To effectuate the leasing of the entire mineral interest,
the defendant necessarily signed as agent of plaintiff as well as
1. The lessee and the escrow agent were also defendants in4 the district court,
but did not join the landowner on appeal.
2. The agreement provided that the bonus of $4,000 and the title to the leased
property would be placed in escrow and the lessee might, within one month before
the beginning of the primary term, examine title and allow the defendant land-




in his individual capacity. The execution of the lease thereby
extended by contract the rights of the plaintiff until the termina-
tion of the lease. Namie v. Namie, 134 So.2d 572 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1961).
Interruption of prescription occurs when a landowner acknowl-
edges the rights of his mineral servitude owner, thereby be-
ginning a new ten-year prescriptive period on the servitude.8 The
courts have stressed that the acknowledgment must clearly ex-
press an intent to interrupt prescription. 4 This principle was
adopted in Mulhern v. Hayne,5 where the court ruled that when a
landowner and servitude owner jointly execute a mineral lease,
and its primary term extends beyond the prescriptive period,
prescription on the servitude is interrupted. However, this ruling
has been modified by later decisions to the effect that there is no
interruption of prescription by execution of a joint lease, but
only an extension until the termination of the lease.0 The courts
have held that an intent to enter into a joint lease is sufficient
to effectuate extension of the servitude, whereas in situations
where there is no joint lease, there must be a clear intent to
interrupt prescription by acknowledgment.7 The rationale is that
if the parties enter into a joint lease, the landowner must intend
for it to be effective as to both his interest and his servitude
owner's interest for at least the duration of the lease, so the
landowner is presumed to have intended that the servitude re-
main in existence for the duration of the lease.8
No Louisiana cases were found which dealt with the time of
the inception of a contract of lease. Generally, however, a con-
tract is operative from the time of the meeting of the minds
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3520 (1870). See also Frost Lumber Industries v.
Republic Prod. Co., 112 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1940) ; James v. Noble, 214 La. 196,
36 So.2d 722 (1948).
4. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Thompson, 222 La. 868, 64 So.2d 202 (1953)
James v. Noble, 214 La. 196, 36 So.2d 722 (1948).
5. 171 La. 1003, 132 So. 659 (1931).
6. Elkins v. Roseberry, 233 La. 59, 96 So.2d 41 (1957) ; Union Oil v. Touchet,
229 La. 316, 86 So.2d 50 (1956) ; Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Miller, 224 La. 216, 69
So.2d 21 (1953) ; Long-Bell Petroleum Co. v. Tritico, 216 La. 426, 43 So.2d 782
(1949) ; Baker v. Wilder, 204 La. 759, 16 So.2d 346 (1943) ; Goree v. Sanders,
203 La. 859, 14 So.2d 744 (1943); White v. Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So.2d 433
(1942) ; Spears v. Nesbitt, 197 La. 931, 2 So.2d 650 (1941) ; Achee v. Caillouet,
197 La. 313, 1 So.2d 530 (1941) ; Hightower v. Maritzky, 194 La. 998, 195 So.
518 (1940) ; Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939) ; Bremer v. North
Central Texas Oil Co., 185 La. 917, 171 So. 75 (1936) ; Louisiana Del Oil
Properties v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 169 La. 1137, 126 So. 684 (1930) ; Placid
Oil Co. v. George, 49 So.2d 500 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
7. See note 6 supra.




of the parties, or when the last act necessary for the completion
is performed.9 The date on the face of the instrument is generally
inconclusive.' Since under Civil Code Article 268411 a lease is
regulated by contract, it should become perfected between the
parties as soon as there exists an agreement for the object and
for the price, although the object has not yet been delivered nor
the price paid. Unless a different intent appears, a written
contract ordinarily dates from the time of delivery and when
the delivery is at a time different from the date on the instru-
ment, the date of delivery is deemed to be the date of inception of
the contract.12 On the other hand, the view has been taken that a
contract runs from the date it bears without regard to the date
of its delivery.13
In other American jurisdictions, a landowner having a min-
eral interest less than the whole has an executive right giving
him the exclusive power to execute oil and gas leases. Generally,
the executive owner of a mineral interest has a duty towards
the non-executive owner to execute a mineral lease to protect
the rights of both when it is reasonably prudent and beneficial
to do so,1 4 and he may not exercise or refuse to exercise the
executive right for the purpose of benefitting himself at the
expense of the non-executive owner.' 5 In Louisiana, the right in
and to minerals is treated as a servitude and a servitude owner
can sell or lease the rights reserved by the servitude regardless
of whether he is the landowner; consequently, there appears to
be no duty on the part of a landowner to execute a lease for the
protection of the servitude owner's rights. 6
9. See note 12 infra. See also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2456 (1870) ; Hicks Body
Co. v. Ward Body Works, Inc., 233 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1956) ; Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 169 Miss. 196, 150 So. 205 (1933)
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Moore, 56 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
10. See note 12 infra. See also Hawley v. Levy, 99 W. Va. 335, 128 S.E.
735 (1925).
11. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2684 (1870) : "The duration and the conditions of
leases are generally regulated by contract, or by mutual consent."
12. 17 C.J.S. Contract8 § 359 (1961).
13. Ibid. See also Greer v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 200 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.
1952); Kishi v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 261 S.W. 228 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924).
14. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 338-339.4 (1959).
15. Id. § 339.2.
16. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 646 (1870). See also Wier v. Texas Co., 180 F.2d
465 (5th Cir. 1950). Note, however, that such a duty may arise through an
agency agreement such as the one in the instant case. The civil law of mandate
and the common law principles of agency involved in this case embrace generallY
the same concepts. The agent owes a duty of good faith in all acts performed on
behalf of the principal in matters connected with the agency. LA. CIVIL CODE
arts. 3003, 3021 (1870); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 387 (1933); Assunto v.
Coleman, 158 La. 537, 104 So. 318 (1925) ; Forshay v. Lewis, 81 So.2d 114 (La.
19621
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In spite of the fact that the lease instrument in the instant
case provided that the primary term was not to begin until after
prescription had run on plaintiff's servitude, the court held that
the lease was valid and binding as of the date it was signed.
Although the court cited no authority for this conclusion,
Articles 2684 and 2456 of the Civil Code 17 could furnish a basis
for it. The court reasoned that the lease instrument and the
escrow agreements were separate instruments, and that the
escrow agreement was executed merely to facilitate a title exami-
nation. Consequently, the escrow agreement seems to have had
no bearing on the effective date of the lease contract. Although
it is not entirely clear from the facts, the lease apparently pro-
vided that the lessee was privileged to enter upon the property
and begin development operations at any time on or after the
signing of the lease. Additionally, it does not appear that the
lease instrument stated any intention of the parties to delay the
inception of the contract. The lease instrument only expressed
an intention to delay the commencement of its primary term.
This being so, the decision reached by the court is consistent with
Article 245618 which provides that a contract of lease is valid and
binding as soon as an agreement as to its terms is reached by
the parties. Thus, despite the fact that the defendant and the
lessee might have intended otherwise, a strict construction of its
terms afforded the court a basis for the holding that the lease
was effective and binding upon signing.
Upon concluding that a leasing of the whole mineral interest
was intended, since it could only have been accomplished by de-
fendant signing both in his individual capacity and as agent
for plaintiff, the court ruled that leasing the entire mineral
interest had the effect of extending by contract the rights of the
plaintiff until the termination of the lease.
App. 2d Cir. 1955). Although there are exceptions, it is usually held that the
principal is not bound for the acts done by the agent which violate the duty of
good faith. However, many such acts outside the authority of the agency which
are done in reliance on the existing agency relationship may be ratified by the
principal, with the result that he obtains the benefits of them. LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 3021 (1870). One of such acts is that in which the agent acts in his own
name purporting to act within the authority vested in him by his principal. 2
PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA
STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2253 (1959); Hopkins v. Lacouture, 4 La. 64
(1832) ; James v. Lewis, 26 La. Ann. 664 (1874).
17. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2456, 2684 (1870).
18. Id. art. 2456: "The sale is considered to be perfect between the parties,
and the property is of right acquired to the purchaser with regard to the seller,
as soon as there exists an agreement for the object and for the price thereof,
although the object has not yet been delivered, nor the price paid."
[Vol. XXII
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In so ruling, the court reached substantially the same result
as the joint lease cases by establishing what amounts to a
fiduciary duty on the part of the landowner to act in this
situation both for his individual interest and as agent for the
servitude owner by denying him the legal opportunity to do
otherwise. If the landowner is denied the opportunity to sign
in any other than the dual capacity, it follows that the necessary
intent to do so is present as a matter of law. Thus, if the lease
contract is executed on behalf of both parties, the rights of the
servitude owner are thereby extended until termination of the
lease.
Although the court's reasoning and the result reached in the
instant case are essentially the same as in a joint lease case, it
did not consider its decision as constituting an extension of the
joint lease theory, in that it did not extend the prescriptive
period, which is characteristic of joint lease cases, but extended
the rights of the plaintiff by contract. Morover, this case is
clearly distinguishable on its facts from the typical acknowl-
edgment-interruption and joint lease cases because the land-
owner lacked the requisite intent to recognize the rights of plain-
tiff or to execute a joint lease. Defendant had an intent to sign
only as the owner of the entire mineral interest which was to
revert to him upon accrual of prescription. Nevertheless, the
court held that he signed in a dual capacity. The court recog-
nized the duty of good faith owed by an agent to his principal
and denied the defendant the opportunity to breach his duty.
Certainly, such a duty is consistent with the principles of the
agency relationship. However, it is suggested that this case be
limited to its facts. Limited application of this duty is felt
necessary to protect the rights of the agent who is also the land-
owner. It should not preclude the exercise of his privilege to
lease or alienate in any way his individual interest when it does
not operate to the detriment of the servitude owner. Neither
should he be absolutely bound to do any affirmative act to extend
the servitude owner's rights beyond the time when a reversion
of the minerals would occur in his favor.19
Allen L. Smith, Jr.
19. In cases where the agent wished to lease only his own, minerals or to act
for himself in any situation where he has a conflict of interest, the court might
impose a duty on the agent to disclose fully to the principal the nature of his acts.
Such disclosure would protect the principal in that he would be made aware of any
such circumstances which might operate to his detriment. This idea is in keeping
with the court's indicated intent to prevent the agent from acting in anything but
1962]
